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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT KURTH and LAURA KURTH ) 
individually, and as Trustees 
of the Kurth Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WIARDA 
Case No. 981582-CA 
Argument Priority: (15) DANIEL R. WIARDA, individually, 
and LONETREE SERVICES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, d.b.a. LONETREE ) 
LOG HOMES, 
) 
Defendants/Appellants. 
JURISDICTION 
This civil appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 
under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (a) (1953, as amended), and was 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on October 20, 1998. 
STATEMENT of ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney 
fees and costs against the Appellant, Wiarda, individually, where the jury returned 
a verdict of no liability on all claims, including, wrongful lien. 
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STANDARD of REVIEW: The Appellate Court will defer to 
the trial court's findings, unless shown to be "clearly erroneous", or the Court 
otherwise reaches "a definite and firm conviction77 that a mistake has been made. 
See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonouqh v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996); 
Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996); and State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Factual findings made by the trial court 
will be upheld unless "clearly erroneous", while legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. See Mostronq v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 
(Utah App. 1993). When reviewing the correctness of legal conclusions, no 
deference is accorded to the trial court. See Tim v. Dewsnup, 920 P.2d 1381 
(Utah 1996). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the trial court erred in determining that 
Appellees were the prevailing party as against Appellant, Wiarda, and in its 
calculation and apportionment of attorney fees and costs. 
STANDARD of REVIEW: Whether the trial court's theory of 
recovery was proper raises a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
See Van Dyke v. Shappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991). The reviewing court 
may affirm a trial court's decision on any proper ground. See Meltrimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 769 
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without 
evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law. See Cove 
View Excavating and Construction Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988). 
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ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney 
fees and costs against Appellant, Wiarda, contrary to its findings and conclusions 
that said Appellant was not liable on all claims and without entering sufficient 
findings or conclusions that established personal liability. 
STANDARD of REVIEW: The Court of Appeals will grant 
deference to the fact finder only when findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to 
disclose the evidentiary basis for the Court's decision. See Woodward v. Fazio, 823 
P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991). The Court of Appeals will defer to findings made by the 
trial court if they are not clearly erroneous; however, the Court of Appeals will 
exercise free review over the trial court's conclusions of law to determine whether 
the trial court correctly stated the applicable law and whether legal conclusions are 
sustained by the facts found. See Antil v. Antil, 908 P.2d 1261, 127 Idaho 954 
(Idaho App. 1996). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the evidence at trial supports the trial 
court's award of attorney fees and costs against the Appellant Wiarda. 
STANDARD of REVIEW: The Utah Appellate Courts do not 
take the trial court's factual findings lightly and, to successfully challenge the trial 
court's findings of fact, Appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate and must 
present every scrap of evidence which supports those findings. Once an Appellant 
who has challenged the trial court's factual findings having established every pillar 
supporting their adversaries' position, they must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence and show why those pillars fail to support the findings. See Oneida/SLIC 
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v. Oneida Cold Storage and Wearhouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994). 
The standard of review in an action at law is that the findings of the trial court are 
as binding on appeal, as the verdict of the jury, and if there is competent evidence 
to support the trial court's findings, they will not be disturbed on appeal. See 
Dismuke v. Cseh, 830 P.2d 188 (Okl. 1992). However, the judge's factual findings 
are not entitled to the more limited review afforded a jury verdict. See Haffer v. All 
Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes to be applicable, but not 
decisive, are as follows: 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1 et. seq. (1953, as amended). 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et. seq. (1953, as amended). 
3. Utah Code Annotated § 16-10(a)-841 (1953, as amended). 
Said statutory references are attached hereto as Addendas 5a, 5b and 5c. 
STATEMENT of the CASE 
NATURE of the CASE: This action begins with the construction of a 
large, custom log home in Iron County, State of Utah, where the Appellees were 
dissatisfied with the workmanship and quality of materials and sued under various 
claims for recovery. Lonetree Services, Inc., as a Utah corporation in good 
standing, (hereafter "Lonetree"), initially incorporated in Utah in 1986, doing 
business as Lonetree Log Homes, performed the construction. The Appellant, 
Daniel R. Wiarda (hereafter "Wiarda"), was a licensed contractor, with fifteen years 
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of experience in log home construction, and an officer and shareholder of Lonetree. 
When Appellees became dissatisfied, they refused to make final payment, ordered 
Lonetree and Wiarda off the project, and hired another contractor to complete the 
project. Lonetree and Wiarda made demand for payment, filed a mechanic's lien 
and initiated suit in October, 1995. 
The mechanic's lien was released by order of the court on the 22nd day of 
July, 1996. The matter went to trial in January, 1998, and the jury returned a 
verdict of liability and awarded damages in the amount of Seven Hundred and 
Forty-Five Thousand ($745,000.00) Dollars, as against Lonetree Services, Inc., but 
returned a verdict of no liability on all claims, as against Appellant Wiarda. The trial 
court reserved the issue of attorney fees, and after considering pleadings and 
hearing argument of counsel, first entered judgment for attorney fees against 
Lonetree Services, Inc., and then later, by interdelineation, changed its judgment 
awarding attorney fees in the sum of Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-
One Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents ($35,821.96) against Appellant Wiarda. 
COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: Lonetree and Wiarda 
initiated suit in October, 1995, for Breach of Contract, Quantum Meruit, damages 
for unjust enrichment and foreclosure of mechanic's lien. Appellees answered, 
brought countersuit and then filed a separate complaint, which combined, alleged 
some twenty-two different causes of action against Lonetree, the Appellant, 
Wiarda, his wife, Carolyn Wiarda, and several other Defendants. 
/ / / 
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Upon motions for summary judgment, all Defendants were dismissed except 
for Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda, individually, and all claims were dismissed 
except for Breach of Contract, Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
Breach of Warranty, Negligence, and Negligence per se, Fraud and 
Misrepresentation, Wrongful Lien and for Punitive Damages. The cases were 
consolidated in April, 1996, with Appellees designated as Plaintiffs and Lonetree and 
Appellant Wiarda designated as Defendants. 
After an eight day trial, commencing in January, 1998, the jury returned a 
verdict of liability and awarded damages in the combined amount of Seven Hundred 
and Forty-Five Thousand ($745,000.00) Dollars, as against Lonetree, but returned 
a verdict of no liability on all claims as against Appellant Wiarda. Judgment was 
entered on the verdict on March 24, 1998. The trial court reserved for further 
argument Appellees claim for attorney fees. After considering further points and 
authorities, hearing argument of counsel, the Court first rendered a Memorandum 
Decision and then entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order against 
Lonetree on the 24th day of April, 1998. 
On June 17, 1998, the court entered a second Order with Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law with virtually the same language found in the Order of April 
24, 1998, except to exclude Lonetree and award attorney fees against Appellant 
Wiarda with some additional commentary in the form of handwritten remarks by 
the trial court which attempt to explain the reason for the change in order, and this 
appeal was taken. This appeal is brought in behalf of Appellant Wiarda challenging 
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the trial court's Order, with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated June 17, 
1998. It does not challenge the trial court's previous orders or the jury verdict as it 
relates to Lonetree and Lonetree waives it claims on appeal. 
STATEMENT of FACTS 
In the fall of 1995, Appellees approached Wiarda (trial transcript at 46 and 
1371), President of Lonetree, (trial transcript at 1362, trial exhibits D235, D253 
and D254) , to supply and construct a log home shell as subcontractor, for a log 
customized home, designed and commenced by Appellees.1 Wiarda submitted a 
bid on behalf of Lonetree based upon the modified plans, which was accepted by 
Appellees. A written contract was entered into (trial transcript at 1374 and 1375, 
trial exhibits P4, P5 and D202), the Appellees made their initial deposit (trial 
transcript at 83-84, trial exhibits P6 and P7) for material and raw stock or logs 
were ordered to be milled and cut (trial transcript at 1395,1396, trial exhibit D212). 
The contract did not provide for attorney fees (trial exhibits P4, P5 and D202). 
Materials were delivered in the spring of 1996 (trial transcript at 1402 and 1404), 
and construction continued on the project into the fall of that year (trial transcript 
at 430). During construction, changes were made (trial transcript at 1381,1446-
1453). Appellees occasionally expressed some dissatisfaction (trial transcript at 
1415, 1418), primarily for what they perceived to be poor workmanship and delay. 
1
 Appellees had previously constructed a basement foundation for the log 
home floor plan that they desired, but proceeded with the matter, as a work in 
progress, requesting that Wiarda make modifications to their design, (trial 
transcript at 42-44, 1374-1376). 
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However, the parties continued to work together until construction was complete 
(trial transcript at 622). A final disagreement arose when Appellees became 
dissatisfied with how the interior had been stained and Lonetree and Wiarda w^re 
ordered off the job2 (trial transcript at 625). Demand was made for final payment 
and when the same was refused, Lonetree and Wiarda filed a mechanic's lien on the 
property (trial transcript at 1510-1514). 
The mechanic's lien was prepared for the signature of Wiarda, who was the 
licensed contractor and Lonetree, where Wiarda signed as its President and his 
wife, Carolyn, attested in corporate form3 (exhibit UA" to Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint, trial exhibit P-258, Addendum 3c, attached). 
Thereafter, Lonetree and Wiarda brought action for Breach of 
Contract, Quantum Meruit, damages for unjust enrichment, and foreclosure of 
mechanic's lien, and Appellees answered, brought counterclaim and then a separate 
complaint asserting twenty-two different claims, including but not limited to, Breach 
of Contract, Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Breach of Warranty, Negligence 
and Negligence Per Se, Fraud and Misrepresentation, Wrongful Lien, and for 
Punitive Damages, which claims went to trial. 
2
 The parties disagree as to whether Lonetree and Wiarda were ordered off 
the job or whether Lonetree and Wiarda refused to sand blast and restain, (see trial 
transcript at page 622). 
3
 The trial court's interdelinated comments of its Order with Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law of June 17, 1998, state that the lien was filed by Dan 
Wiarda and not Lonetree Services, Inc., therefore the Judgment is entered against 
Dan Wiarda individually, as to attorney fees and court costs, which is inconsistent 
with what the document states (see record at 1363, addendum 2c, attached). 
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After an eight day trial, the jury returned a verdict of liability as against 
Lonetree; more particularly, for Breach of Contract, Breach of Duty of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing, and/or Breach of Warranty, Lonetree was determined to be liable 
with no amount designated; for Negligence and/or Negligence Per Se, Lonetree was 
found liable and damages were awarded in the amount of Five Hundred and Forty-
Five Thousand Dollars ($545,000.00); for Fraud and/or Misrepresentation, 
(Misrepresentation being circled) Lonetree was found to be liable and damages 
awarded in the amount of One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($120,000.00), and; regarding Punitive Damages, Lonetree's conduct was 
determined to warrant an award of punitive damages of Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($80,000.00), (jury verdict, record at 1055-1060, addendum l b , attached). 
Neither Lonetree nor Wiarda, were determined to be liable for filing a 
wrongful lien and Wiarda, individually, was found not liable on all of Appellees 
claims. Id. 
It was further determined by the jury that Appellees were not liable for the 
claim for Breach of Contract asserted by Lonetree and Wiarda. Since it had been 
previously ordered by the court on the 22nd day of July, 1996, that the mechanic's 
lien be released, (Order Releasing Lien, record at 359-361, addendum 3a, 
attached), no jury verdict was rendered upon the question of whether or not 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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the mechanic's lien was proper or could be foreclosed, except for the jury's 
determination that the lien was not wrongful.4 
Judgment on the Verdict (record at 1297-1300, addendum la , attached), 
was prepared by counsel for Appellees and entered by the Court on the 24th day of 
March, 1998, making the following order, judgment and decree: 
1. That ail claims of Plaintiffs as against Daniel 
R. Wiarda, individually, as set forth in this matter, 
shall be and they hereby are, dismissed with 
prejudice and upon the merits. Id. at Hi. 
(emphasis added). 
7. That all claims of Daniel R. Wiarda, individually, 
and of Defendant Lonetree Services, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation, d/b/a Lonetree Log Homes, pertaining 
to unjust enrichment, breach of contract, Mechanics' 
Lien and any other claims, against Plaintiffs, Robert 
Kurth and Laura Kurth, individually, and as Trustees 
of the Kurth revocable trust, should be and they 
hereby are, dismissed, with prejudice and upon the 
merits. Id. at H 7. 
8. That as against Defendants Lonetree Services, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, d/b/a Lonetree Log Homes, 
Plaintiffs' claims of wrongful lien should be and they 
hereby are dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits. Id. at H 8. 
4
 Since the mechanic's lien had been released and the issue of attorney fees 
reserved at trial, there is little discussion in the trial transcript regarding either. 
Those places where discussed in the transcript are included as addendum 5d. 
attached. While Appellant concedes that the discussion between attorney and the 
bench is inconclusive on the issues, the dialogue suggests that the trial judge at the 
time of trial gave instructions number 52 and 53, for claim for wrongful lien and 
contracting parties, as an indicator as to whether or not he would award attorney 
fees and against whom. 
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9. That Plaintiffs Robert Kurth and Laura Kurth, 
individually, and as Trustees of the Kurth revocable 
trust, should be and they hereby are, awarded their 
costs of court incurred in connection with these 
proceedings, as against Lonetree Services, Inc., a 
Utah Corporation, d/b/a Lonetree Log Homes, said 
costs to be taxed in accordance with the law. Id. 
at H 9. (emphasis added.) 
10. That Plaintiffs, having prevailed in Defendants' 
action to enforce a mechanic's lien, are entitled to 
an award of attorney fees, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 38-1-18 (1953, as amended). The same 
to be fixed by the court and taxed as costs upon 
appropriate application. Id. at H 10. 
On or about the 7th day of April, 1998, the Court entered its Memorandum 
Decision, (record at 303-310, addendum 2a, attached), finding that: 
...in as much as Plaintiffs' prevailed against 
Defendant Lonetree Services, Inc., at trial, and 
this court executed a Judgment on Verdict on 
March 24, 1998, ordering the claims against Plaintiff's 
pertaining to unjust enrichment, Breach of Contract, 
and Mechanic's Lien to be dismissed, this Court finds 
Plaintiffs to be entitled to reasonable attorney fees 
and costs in an amount of Thirty Thousand Two 
Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars and Seventy-Six 
Cents, ($30,233.76), which is supported by the 
following findings and conclusions. Id. at 310, 
H 2nd. (emphasis added). 
The trial court then apportioned fees based upon the number of claims 
prevailed upon, six, in comparison to the twenty-two original claims asserted. The 
calculation did not take into account the fact that Appellant, Wiarda, had prevailed 
on all claims, and that Lonetree had been determined not liable for wrongful lien, 
liable but no damages awarded for Breach of Contract, Breach of Duty of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing, and Breach of Warranty, on the jury verdict form. Further, 
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the court did not take into account the fact that upon the claims prevailed upon by 
Appellees, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Fraud or Misrepresentation, and Punitive 
Damages, there is no statutory or contractual basis for an award of attorney fees. 
The court's memorandum decision further fails to designate with clarity, which, if 
either of the Defendants would be specifically liable. The rationale of the court 
strongly suggests an award of attorney fees against Lonetree, the rationale of the 
court breaks down entirely if Appellant Wiarda is added into the calculation or was 
intended as the sole party against whom attorney fees would be awarded. 
On the 24th day of April, 1998, the Court entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order consistent with its memordandum decision and 
awarding fees and costs against Lonetree (record at 1313-1320, addendum 2b, 
attached). On the 17th day of June, 1998, (record at 1356-1363, addendum 2c, 
attached), the trial court entered an Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, which mirrors, for the most part, the same paragraphs of its previous Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, except for additions made by 
interdelineation, and increased the award from Thirty Thousand Two Hundred and 
Thirty-Three Dollars and Seventy-Six Cents ($30,233.76) to Thirty-Five Thousand 
Eight Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents ($35,821.96) and 
designating most importantly Appellant Wiarda liable in place of Lonetree. The 
added written comments by the court suggest that the change was based upon the 
court's erroneous assumption that the mechanic's lien was filed by Appellant Wiarda 
individually and not on behalf of Lonetree. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant Wiarda brings this appeal to challenge the trial court's 
award of attorney fees against him personally. Appellant asserts that the trial 
court erred in not recognizing Appellant as the prevailing party at trial. Appellant 
asserts that the trial court's calculation of attorney fees offers no rational legal 
basis, since the claims by Appellees on which they prevailed, do not provide for 
attorney fees statutorially or contractually. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees, that 
could not be reasonably differentiated for defense of the mechanic's lien from other 
claims prosecuted or defended by Appellees in the context of multiple claims and 
parties, and complex litigation. Appellant Wiarda contends that the trial court 
erred in concluding that Appellant Wiarda was solely and individually responsible for 
the filing of the mechanic's lien and that as a result of such filing should be liable for 
attorney fees relating to the entire litigation, even though the mechanic's lien had 
been released prior and was not litigated as an issue at trial. While Utah Code 
Annotated 38-1-18 (1953, as amended), provides for the recovery of attorney fees 
to the prevailing party, this Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not 
acknowledging the jury's verdict that the lien was not wrongful, that this Appellant 
was found not liable on all claims, and that by the trial court's previous order, the 
mechanic's lien had been released. 
Appellant Wiarda asserts that the trial court went beyond the evidence 
presented, or erroneously concluded from its own interpretation of the evidence, 
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including its review of the documents filed and its own previous orders, that the 
Appellant Wiarda was solely and individually liable. The Appellant asserts that the 
court's rationale and assessment is flawed, both from its factual determination and 
legal analysis and cannot survive the scrutiny of the Court of Appeals, whether 
applying the ''clearly erroneous" or "correctness" standard of review. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
APPELLEES WERE THE PREVAILING PARTY AS 
AGAINST APPELLANT WIARDA. 
The result of the trial court's rationale in its Memoradum Decision determines 
the Appellees to be the prevailing party by reason of the jury verdict award, as 
against Lonetree (see addendum 2a, at page 1, record at 1310), and then makes 
its own calculation for the reasonable amount of attorney fees to award Appellees. 
Although the memorandum decision is not specific as to the responsible or liable 
party, the court's reasoning is clearly directed towards Lonetree. If Appellant 
Wiarda was contemplated by the court as the responsible party, its calculation and 
analysis would have been different. It is only upon the trial court's final 
consideration and mistaken assumption that Wiarda individually filed the 
mechanic's lien that it changed the final order. 
The difficulties in the rationale stem from the difficulties in the circumstances. 
The trial court found and concluded that the issues in the case were unusually 
complex and intertwined, that a substantial amount of discovery was conducted, 
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that the accounting by counsel for Appellees did not reflect a precise amount of 
time spent on each cause of action and that it would not be common for attorneys 
to keep records in such a manner (memorandum decision, record at 1308-1309, 
addendum 2a, attached). Counsel for Appellees acknowledged in their affidavits 
that an equitable apportionment was in order, since time spent on each cause of 
action could not be distinguished and many of the claims were intertwined (record 
at 180 and 1284, Affidavits attached as addendas 4a and 4b). The trial court made 
an equitable calculation by awarding 6/22, or twenty-seven (27%) percent, 
(accounting for six of twenty-two causes of action, which the court believed were 
prevailed upon), and reducing the fees accordingly, (memorandum decision, record 
at 1307-1308, addendum 2a, attached). 
The court awarded costs in the amount of Twelve Thousand Four Hundred 
and Sixty-Five Dollars and Ninety-Eight Cents ($12,465.98), (memorandum 
decision, record at 1304-1307, addendum 2a, attached), which included sheriff 
fees, investigative costs, a surety premium bond, postage and filing expenses, copy 
expenses, witness fees, and deposition costs. While the court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of April 24, 1998, excluded the expert witness costs, 
the same appear to have been included in the court's Order with Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law of June 17th 1998 (R at 1358, 1362, addendum 2c, 
attached). 
Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended), provides for 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action. The prevailing 
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party includes those successful in defending the enforcement of such lien. See 
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). As mentioned 
previously, whether the trial court's theory of recovery is proper, raises a question 
of law, which the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness. See Van Dyke v. 
Shappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991). The Court of Appeals may affirm on 
any proper ground. See Meltrimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 
P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). 
In Penn Investment Co. v. Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the sole issue of an award of attorney fees regarding 
foreclosure of a mechanics7 lien. In deciding that the Mechanics' Lien Statute 
applied and that reasonable attorney fees should be awarded, the Supreme Court 
gave some indication that there was a limitation for an award of attorney fees 
where the mechanic's lien was not foreclosed as either a claim or a counterclaim. 
The instant case presents the circumstance where the Supreme Court questioned 
the statute's application since the mechanic's lien in this case was not in 
controversey. There was no issue of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien at trial 
because the same had been released by order of the court on July 22, 1996. 
In general, attorney fees are only awardable if authorized by statute or 
contract. Even if provided by contract, the award of attorney fees is allowed only in 
accordance with the terms of the contract, or within the contemplation of the 
statute, Travnerv. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). Drawing a 
comparison, the Utah Supreme Court in L & M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 450 
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(Utah 1984), found that where a contract was not subject to litigation, the 
contractual provisions allowing for attorney fees were not applicable. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 754 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth some practical guidelines for awarding attorney fees and 
offered the scrutiny of four basic questions: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adeguately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services? 
4. Are their circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listing in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility? Id. at 990. (emphasis added.) 
While litigation can often be complex and involve numerous claims and 
parties, the Utah Supreme Court, in attempting to guard against the abuse of 
discretion, has scrutinized attorney fee awards. In Turtle Management, Inc., v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
When a Plaintiff has a substantial claim against 
one Defendant, he should not have a free right 
to assert claims against other Defendants with 
the expectation that the target Defendant will 
end up paying all attorney fees, even those 
related to unsuccessful and perhaps frivolous 
claims. 
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In the instant case, the claims upon which Appellees prevailed, and received 
an award of damages, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Fraud or Misrepresentation, 
and for Punitive Damages, are not claims upon which attorney fees are generally 
awarded statutorily per se. While there was a contract involved in this case, the 
contract did not provide for attorney fees. Since the issue of foreclosure of the lien 
was not an issue at trial, the only question on the jury verdict form that related to 
the issue of lien was that of wrongful lien asserted by Appellees, upon which 
Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda prevailed (jury verdict, record at 1058 and 1059, 
addendum l b , attached). 
POINT NO. II 
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN AND NOTICE OF LIS 
PENDENS WAS RELEASED BY PREVIOUS 
ORDER OF THE COURT DATED THE 22N D DAY 
OF JULY, 1996, OVER A YEAR AND A HALF 
PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
Although it is difficult to speculate upon the court's reasoning for awarding 
attorney fees against Appellant Wiarda, individually, it is clear from the record that 
the mechanic's lien and lis pendens were released by the trial court's previous order 
in July, 1996 (record at 359-362, addendum 3a, attached). Effectively, the 
mechanic's lien, dated October 12, 1995, and recorded October 23, 1995, as Entry 
No. 356460 in Book 545 at Pages 600-602, of the official records of the Iron County 
Recorder's Office, constituted an encumbrance upon the property, if at all, only until 
the 23rd day of July, 1996, when the trial court's order releasing the lien was 
/ / / 
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recorded, as Entry No. 367485, in Book 573 at Pages 257-300 in said recorder's 
office. Id. 
By the time the matter went to trial in the end of January, 1998, the issue of 
mechanic's lien foreclosure was no longer a part of the litigation and was not an 
issue at trial. The mechanic's lien had been released just after Appellees had 
retained the services of attorney Willard Bishop to serve as co-counsel. The expert 
witness testimony and the fees related thereto went to the issues of workmanship 
and quality of material and did not address a defense to the foreclosure of the 
mechanic's lien. Most of the litigation costs and discovery expenses were incurred 
after the mechanic's lien had been released. It appears clearly beyond the scope of 
legislative intent allowing for the recovery of attorney fees in an action for 
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien to allow for the award of attorney fees for discovery 
and litigation, including a jury trial, that occurred more than a year and a half after 
the release of the lien. 
Pursuant to the final paragraph of the order releasing lien, Lonetree and 
Appellant Wiarda were barred from further action or foreclosure on the lien, it 
reads: 
It is further ordered, that each and every Defendant 
in this action shall be forever denied from having 
any and all possessory rights and be prohibited from 
asserting any claims whatsoever in or to said real 
property of which the Plaintiff's claim or otherwise 
hold an interest therein. Id. at H 5. 
Consequently, Appellant Wiarda asserts that the trial court erred in 
determining that attorney fees should be awarded for causes of action which 
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otherwise would no allow for the recovery of attorney fees, based upon the 
statutory language of 38-1-18 (1953, as amended) when foreclosure of a 
mechanic's lien was no longer an issue in controversy at trial or during most of the 
period of discovery. 
In addition, Appellant Wiarda asserts that the issue of attorney fees, if it 
were to be addressed, should have been addressed in the court's previous order 
releasing the mechanic's lien, or at the very least, the issue reserved for trial, so as 
to put Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda on notice prior to the time of trial. No such 
language exists in the order. Appellant Wiarda asserts that the issue of recovery 
of attorney fees, pursuant to a mechanic's lien theory of recovery was waived at 
the time that the lien was released and should not have been used by the court 
following trial as its basis for such an award. Appellant Wiarda further asserts that 
while the trial court's calculation of attorney fees is questionable both as to its legal 
basis and factual determination, complicated in part by depositions, witness fees, 
expert witness expenses, and additional representation at the time of trial, the 
calculation of attorney fees at the time the mechanic's lien was released is a 
comparatively simple calculation that can be determined by scrutinizing the billings 
of attorney Robert 0. Kurth, Jr., which were previously itemized and provided to 
the court, (see record at 1187, 1285, addendum 4a, attached.) 
Since Appellees initially filed an answer and asserted a counterclaim in 
response to the initial complaint filed by Lonetree and Appellant Wiarda, and since 
there is considerable duplication in the assertion of the counterclaim and the 
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additional separate causes of action, the attorney fees incurred in defending the 
initial complaint can be readily determined from those in bringing the separate 
complaint, without having to go into the equitable analysis and rationale of the trial 
court in rendering its memorandum decision. The total fees generated by attorney 
Kurth, up to the release of lien, appear to be Two Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-
Four Dollars and Fifty Cents ($3,910.50), and those that appear to relate to the 
defense of the mechanics' lien are Two Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Nine Dollars 
and Fifty Cents ($2,964.50). The total fees generated by attorney Bishop, up to 
the release of lien, appear to be One Hundred and Eighty ($180.00) Dollars. 
POINT NO. HI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CALCULATION AND 
APPORTIONMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES IS FLAWED 
BOTH IN ITS LEGAL ANALYSIS AS WELL AS ITS 
FACTUAL DETERMINATION. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 1985 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court made it clear the that trial court enjoys broad discretion in 
evaluating the evidence to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee. What 
constitutes a reasonable fee is not necessarily controlled by any set formula. See 
Wallace v. Build, Inc.. 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965). However, an award 
of attorney fees must generally be made on the basis of findings; cf fact, supported 
by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of law. See Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). What is reasonable depends upon a number of factors. 
The Court has upheld a trial court's determination of a middle ground position 
between two estimates of what constituted a reasonable fee. See Alexander v. 
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Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). But if the fees are determined to be reasonable, 
they are reluctant to reduce the same simply because they appear to be 
disproportionate to the overall result or determination of the litigation in question. 
See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 964 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). 
In the instant case, the sole legal theory upon which attorney fees were 
awarded was based upon the Mechanic's Lien statute. However, it goes beyond 
any reasonable or rational basis to apply the statutory provisions to circumstances 
relating to this case, where the mechanic's lien had in fact been released prior to 
trial and also prior to the time when most of the discovery costs were incurred in 
preparation for trial; where the claims prevailed upon at trial did not independently 
provide for attorney fees; where no evidence was presented at trial for determining 
an amount or the reasonableness of attorney fees; where the only issue presented 
at trial relating to lien foreclosure involved Appellees' claim for wrongful lien, upon 
which Lonetree and Wiarda prevailed; where findings submitted by Appellees for 
Judgment on the Verdict included a finding that Appellant Wiarda was not liable on 
all claims of Appellees, and; where no substantial findings were made in support 
the trial court's legal conclusion that Appellant Wiarda solely and individually filed 
the mechanic's lien. 
POINT NO. IV 
SINCE THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS NOT 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL AS PART OF THE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES, IT IS FAIR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE 
JURY ASSUMED THAT ITS AWARD OF DAMAGES 
INCLUDED ATTORNEY FEES AS PART OF THE 
ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES SUSTAINED. 
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In Glezof v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995), the Utah 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of additional damages for actual attorney fees 
in the context of a claim for liquidated damages. In that case, evidence of the 
amount incurred in attorney fees in defending a forfeiture was presented at trial in 
the context of a contractual provision found within a deed of trust allowing a 
percentage of the remaining balance for attorney fees as liquidated damages. 
Addressing the matter from a standpoint of compensatory damages, the Court of 
Appeals stated that while the contract entitles the party to the attorney fees "it 
incurred, and under the above authority, those fees should be considered part of 
the actual damages... sustained. However, the fees should not be awarded as 
additional compensatory damages, as this would be duplicative." Id. at 1236. 
In short, if the measure of damages presented to the jury at the time of trial 
as compensation for damages is to be considered complete and all inclusive, then 
the award of attorney fees would be additional and duplicative to the compensatory 
damages determined. In other words, Appellees would recover twice, once for 
compensatory damages awarded by the jury and again for attorney fees awarded 
by the trial court. The award itself would be inconsistent with the jury verdict. 
POINT NO. V 
THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER WITH FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DATED JUNE 
17th , 1998, IS INCONSISTENT WITH AND 
IRRECONCILABLE TO ITS PREVIOUS ORDERS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS. 
/ / / 
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The trial court's order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law filed June 
17th, 1998 is interesting when considered on its face and in light of the court's 
previous rulings and findings. The language is virtually identical to the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 24, 1998, except to make Appellant 
Wiarda liable as opposed to Lonetree, increased the award from Thirty Thousand 
Two Hundred, Thirty-Three Dollars and Seventy-Six Cents ($30,233.76) to Thirty-
Five Thousand, Eight Hundred, Twenty-One Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents 
($35,821.96) (presumably to include the expense of expert witness fees of James 
Smith and Antone Thompson as costs), and included some comments by 
interdelination. Pursuant to paragraph 8 thereof, after identifying the Mechanic's 
Lien statutory provision for recovery of attorney fees to the successful party, the 
trial court states: 
....This court finds that, in dismissing the claim 
against Plaintiffs pertaining to the Mechanics7 Lien 
the Plaintiffs are the successful party and are 
therefore statutorially entitled to be awarded 
reasonable attorney fees, against the party who 
filed the lien. In this case, the lien was filed by 
Dan Wiarda and not Lonetree Services, Inc., 
therefore, judgment is entered against Dan 
Wiarda, individually, as to attorney fees and 
court costs, (record at 1361, Addendum 2c) 
(the underlined portion represents the additions 
by the trial court's interdeliniation). 
It should be noted that there was no hearing or finding regarding Appellant 
Wiarda prior to this determination. At the time of trial, the jury, supposedly the 
trier of fact in the case, was not asked to make such a factual determination. In 
reviewing the evidence, Wiarda testified that the mechanic's lien was filed because 
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Appellees refused to pay Lonetree's final bill, (trial transcript at 1508-1514). The 
document itself bears the signature of Dan Wiarda, who was a general contractor 
and Dan Wiarda as President of Lonetree Services, Inc., attested to in corporate 
form by its secretary, Carolyn Wiarda. (Trial exhibit P-258, addendum 3c, 
attached.) 
When compared to the court's previous Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, of April 24, 1998, the rest of the language of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of June 17, 1998, are virtually the same, except to 
conclude that attorney fees and costs be awarded against one Defendant as 
opposed to the other. (Record at 1313-1320). While the rationale of the trial 
court's memorandum decision filed April 7, 1998, does not specifically mention 
Lonetree or Appellant Wiarda, the basis of the court's analysis is clearly directed 
toward Lonetree and consistent with the conclusions reached in the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 24, 1998. However, the 
memorandum decision noticeably fails to even mention in its analysis the 
interdelineated finding that so radically changed the result of the court's Order with 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated June 17, 1998. Had the court fully 
appreciated the significance of this unsubstantiated finding regarding Appellant 
Wiarda, one can only assume that the court would have reviewed its previous 
orders and findings to try and decide the remaining issue consistently. 
However, the prior findings and rulings of the trial court are in fact 
inconsistent with this final order. For instance, on March 24, 1998, there was filed 
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by the court judgment on the verdict prepared by Appellees7 counsel, (record at 
1297-1300). The first paragraph thereof states clearly that as to aH claims of 
Plaintiffs (this presumably included those decided and to be decided) against Daniel 
R. Wiarda, individually, the same were dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits. Paragraph ten of the same document made clear that the court was 
contemplating a claim for an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 38-1-18 (1953, as amended), yet no qualification was made 
upon the dismissal of Wiarda. 
Similarly, the court failed to take into account the fact that it had previously 
released the mechanics7 lien on July 22, 1996 (record at 359-362). Therefore, the 
court's reasoning for applying the statutory remedy for attorney fees deserved 
further findings substantiating its application. Again, the memorandum decision 
makes no reference to this disparity in the court's analysis or assessment. 
At the time of trial, the dialogue between the attorneys and the court in 
discussing jury instructions and the form of the verdict, suggests that the court was 
interested in separating the claim for wrongful lien for purposes of determining 
whether attorney fees should be awarded. Regarding whether or not instruction 
no. 32 should be given the following dialogue took place: 
Mr. Jackson: I don't think we've got a wrongful 
lien claim and I don't think there's-
Attorney Kurth: I know that we do, I know that our 
counterclaim initially, well the 
Defendants were the Plaintiffs and 
they filed the Complaint to foreclose. 
/ / / 
Page 26 of 35 
In our counterclaim we asserted that 
the lien was wrongful. 
The Judge: Can you find that? As much as I hate 
to ask that. 
Attorney Kurth: It's probably in my car outside (short 
inaudible, two speakers.) 
The Judge: I'll tell you what, let's keep going 
unless you've got one right there. 
(Inaudible discussion among attorneys.) 
The Clerk: (Short inaudible, no mic.) 
The Judge: Okay. 
Mr. Bishop: What, are you still here? 
The Judge: We're making progress without you. 
Mr. Bishop: Should I go back out there? 
The Judge: Go back out in the lobby. 
Mr. Bishop: I've got to stand so that I can open 
the door when its gets here. 
The Judge: Oh, Okay. 
Mr. Bishop: It's locked. 
Mr. Jackson: Answer to counterclaim. We have 
non-compliance with plans, specif-
ications, building code, unjust 
enrichment, offset, expungment of 
lien and punitive damages. 
Attorney Kurth: What does the first one say? 
Mr. Jackson: The first one? 
Attorney Kurth: If I named it specifically. 
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Mr. Jackson: 
Attorney Kurth: 
Mr. Jackson: 
The Judge: 
Attorney Kurth: 
The Judge: 
Mr. Jackson: 
The Judge: 
Common allegation. 
Wrongful lien, first cause of action. 
Our basis for that is the statute 
provides for attorney fees. I wouid 
think just— well looking at the 
instruction I guess concerning 
mechanic's liens, and if you defend 
a mechanic's lien you're successful. 
Well, but-
Well, that cuts both ways. If you 
prevail, you get attorney fees, if 
you prevail, you get yours. 
Well, that's another instruction, 
but there is, we do have a 
wrongful lien claim. 
Okay. And that's their first claim? 
It's designated (short, inaudible, 
two speakers.) 
All right, let's use this as number 52, 
Attorneys' fees concerning mechanic's 
lien or wrongful lien (trial transcript 
at 2030-2032). 
Up to that point, at the time of trial, it seemed evident that the jury's factual 
determination on the issue of wrongful lien would become the key factor in 
determining whether to award attorney fees. The court obviously reconsidered its 
position in issuing its memorandum decision, at least to the point of finding that 
Appellees were the prevailing party, notwithstanding the jury's response on the jury 
verdict form, to the issue of wrongful lien. 
/ / / 
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The court's review of the mechanic's hen and its interpretation is more a legal 
question than an factual question. Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1, et seq. (1953, 
as amended), provides the statutory provisions regarding mechanic's hens, Section 
3 that: 
contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing or providing any materials or 
equipment used in the construction shall.... have a hen 
upon the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor...acting by his authority 
as agent, contractor or otherwise. 
Section 7, sets forth the contents of the Notice of Claim and subsection (e) 
thereof addresses the signature of the hen claimant, identifying that the same could 
be done by the claimant or its authorized agent. 
In the notice of hen itself, Dan Wiarda identifies himself as the undersigned, 
doing business as Lonetree Log Homes, and as the President of Lonetree Services, 
Inc., as the one asserting the hen by reason of materials provided and services 
rendered to Appellees. The contract with Appellees was with Lonetree. Appellant 
Wairda was identified on the contract as the authorized agent of the corporation. 
Wiarda's actions were those of the corporation. Appellant Wiarda is entitled to the 
protections of the Utah Code limiting liability of corporate officers and directors. At 
Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-841 (1953, as amended), it states that a 
corporation may "eliminate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation, or to 
its shareholders for monetary damages for any action taken or any failure to take 
any action as a director " 
/ / / 
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A corporation and its stockholders are presumed separate and distinct, 
whether the stockholders are many or only one. In Utah it is recognized that a 
corporation and its shareholders are separate and distinct legal entities and has 
validated the purpose of such a distinction to insulate the stockholders from the 
liabilities of the corporation, thus limiting their liability to only the amount the 
stockholders voluntarily put at risk. Schafir v. Harriqan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 
1994), see also Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Construction Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
App. 1988). In Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 
1979), the Utah Supreme Court established a two-prong test in deciding when to 
pierce the corporate veil: 
In order to disregard the corporate entity, there must 
be a concurrence of two circumstances: 
1) There must be such unity of interest in ownership 
that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist, Viz, the corporation is, in fact, 
the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and 
2) Observance of the corporate form would sanction 
a fraud, promote injustice, or, an inequitable result would 
follow. Id. at 1030. 
Other states have established a similar bench mark. See Rowland v. LaPiere, 
662 P.2d 1332 (Nev. 1982). In Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 fUtah App. 1987), 
the Utah Court of Appeals identified certain significant factors, which although not 
conclusive, were key for consideration: (1) undercapitalization of a one-man 
corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of 
dividends; (4) syphoning of corporate funds by the dominate stockholder; (5) non-
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functioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the 
use of the corporation as a facade for operations of a dominate stockholder; and 
(8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. Id. at 786. 
In the instant case, although Appellees have asserted more than twenty-two 
different causes of action against Lonetree and Wiarda, there is no allegation, 
assertion or claim, attempting to pierce the corporate veil, or attempting to 
establish the business operation of Lonetree as a sham or fraud, or attempting to 
show undercapitalization, or any other factor considered significant in such an 
inquiry. Moreover, at the time of trial, there was no evidence presented regarding 
issues related to piercing of the corporate veil. Through the course of the 
proceedings, at trial, or after, there has not been a single finding made by the court 
in its various orders and rulings which attempts to challenge the validity of Lonetree 
as a Utah Corporation in good standing, which was in fact established at trial, by 
evidence that went uncontroverted. (trial transcript at 1367, trial exhibits D-235, 
D-253 & D-254). 
It has been the standing policy of the Courts of Appeal in the State of Utah, 
that the corporate veil which protects stockholders and officers from individual 
liability, will be pierced only reluctantly and cautiously. See Colman, 743 P.2d at 
786. Finally, while it is difficult to see how individual liability could be found without 
at least addressing the issue of corporate status, it is clear from the court's 
memorandum decision, that such a consideration was not part of the trial court's 
rationale or analysis in rendering its decision. 
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In reviewing the pleadings, the analysis of the court, the record, and the 
evidence presented at trial, it seems clear to Appellant Wiarda that after the jury 
awarded such a substantial award of damages against Lonetree, the trial court 
believed that attorney fees were warranted, notwithstanding the jury's 
determination on the question of wrongful lien. Since the court had made a finding 
that Appellees had prevailed on the claims asserted by Lonetree and Wiarda, the 
court based it rationale for award on the mechanic's lien statute, not realizing that 
the lien had in fact been released by its own previous order and anticipating that 
the award would be directed against Lonetree. The court's analysis in its 
memorandum decision strongly suggests that the Court had Lonetree in mind at 
the party liable for the attorney fees. The court's judgment on the verdict confirms 
that notion that there was no anticipation of Appellant Wiarda being responsible for 
attorney fees, or the judgment on the verdict would have so stated. 
The court's initial Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of April 24, 
1998, represents the logical outcome of the court's analysis and reasoning. It 
seems clear that sometime between the issuance of the court's initial Order and 
subsequent Order, the court reconsidered its decision by reviewing the notice of lien 
and came to the conclusion that the lien was filed by Dan Wiarda, individually, and 
not as an agent or officer of Lonetree and that somehow this single additional 
finding alone justified the change in attorney fee award from Lonetree to Appellant 
Wiarda and assumed that its prior rationale and analysis would equally apply. 
There are simply no facts presented at trial or made a part of the record that 
Page 32 of 35 
supports such a finding and the legal analysis is so skewed by the change that it is 
in error, and one cannot have anything but a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. 
POINT NO. VI 
THE COSTS OF COURT ARE ALSO UNWARRANTED 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Perhaps there is no clearer indication that the trial court had Lonetree in 
mind when determining that Appellees were the prevailing party than when 
addressing its findings regarding the award of costs and other expenses of 
litigation. If it was clear in the court's mind that Appellant Wiarda was to be the 
party to whom costs would be assessed, the rationale would have been entirely 
different. Appellant Wiarda had prevailed on all of the twenty-two claims that were 
asserted by Appellees and had only lost on its counterclaim for Breach of Contract. 
For the assessment of court costs and expenses, including expert witness expenses, 
there just does not seem to be the compelling basis for such an award if one 
excludes Lonetree from the analysis. If the court had considered Appellant Wiarda 
to be equally and jointly responsible, the calculations and the analysis of the court 
would also have been different, both with regard to the attorney fees as with court 
costs and expenses. 
In addressing such costs, the court again identified the costs being assessed 
against, in this case, the losing party of a civil action. Yet to identify Appellant 
Wiarda as the losing party is contrary to the evidence and verdict. It is clear that 
the court had in mind Lonetree as the losing party and from that standpoint the 
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rationale of the court is reasonable. From the standpoint of witnesses fees, the 
expert testimony of Smith and Thompson went to the issue of negligence. 
However, Wiarda was the prevailing party on Appellees claims for negligence. The 
same applies for deposition costs, for services costs and witness fees. As a result, 
and for the same reasons asserted previously regarding the issue of attorney fees, 
Appellant Wiarda asserts that the award for costs and expenses was also in error 
and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant Wiarda 
prays that relief be granted in reversing the trial court's decision in awarding 
attorney fees and costs against said Appellant, or that the same be remanded, 
ordering that judgment be entered consistent with the evidence at trial and the 
court's previous findings and conclusions, finding the Appellant Wiarda not liable on 
all claims of Appellees and that the same be dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits, together with such additional and further relief as this Court deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this i day of /) /^l/f/U^ 19^2^? 
Page 34 of 35 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct photocopy of BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT W^ARDA, by way of U.S, mail, postage fully prepaid, on this 
Irr^ay of /yC-fJ^ 19 to the following: 
ROBERT 0. KURTH, JR. 
KURTH & ASSOCIATES 
Post Office Box 42816 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89116-2816 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C. 
36 North 300 West 
Post Office Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0279 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
Page 35 of 35 
